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Under the headline SHABBY, 
The Sun asserted “Security at 
virus lab blasted as ‘a disaster in 
waiting’ five years ago”. This was 
a reference to a Biotechnology 
and Biological Sciences Research 
Council report which had indeed 
commented that some parts of 
the site were shabby. It had not, 
however, criticised biosecurity nor 
warned of a disaster in waiting. 
Finally, an all-purpose columnist in 
The Sunday Times regaled readers 
with “the farm horrors we deserve”.
The other major error was 
made by those newspapers and 
broadcasting channels which, 
while relaying news of successive 
developments in efforts to discern 
precisely how the outbreak 
had originated, also mounted 
searches for scapegoats. Not 
content to await the outcomes of 
three separate enquiries — one 
by Defra, one by the Health and 
Safety Executive, and another by 
Brian Spratt of Imperial College, 
London, they began to make 
insinuations about individuals who 
might be to blame. 
“Is this how virus was spread? 
Scientist took drums from vaccine 
lab to his allotment beside field 
where foot and mouth broke 
out,” announced the Daily Mail, 
alongside three photographs of 
chemical containers in the garden 
and allotment of a senior Merial 
employee. “The labels on the 
containers suggested they had 
indeed come from the vaccine 
centre,” the paper said. “One was 
marked ‘BDH AnalR’, a brand 
name of powerful laboratory 
chemicals available only from 
Merck Eurolab — the parent 
company of Merial.” Despite the 
company’s explanation of why 
there was no possible link with 
the foot-and-mouth outbreak, 
the Daily Express published the 
same story, again with three 
photographs, the following day.
An unusual feature of the whole 
episode was the assiduousness 
with which, within hours of 
the first news and each day 
thereafter, the IAH circulated 
carefully drafted statements to 
the press. This is something 
which other beleaguered research 
establishments in the past have 
failed to consider important or 
worthwhile.
One IAH release followed 
confused reports about the likely 
release of viable foot-and mouth 
virus through drainage water at 
Pirbright. The release explained 
the drainage and effluent treatment 
systems on the site, together with 
the results at that time of internal 
and external investigations. 
Allegations about contaminated 
water then immediately 
disappeared from media reports.
The only sign of irritation from 
the IAH came when a press story 
(in line with several highlighting 
dangers posed by research 
centres bristling with dangerous 
germs) alleged that the IAH had 
also been the source of Legionella 
contamination. The reality 
was that, following a case of 
legionellosis in a contractor who 
had worked briefly at Pirbright, 
tests on water there had showed 
a level of the organism which the 
HSE categorised as insignificant. 
The allegation, a statement 
said, “has been a regrettable 
distraction for our scientists 
currently working 24 hours a 
day on testing samples from the 
current F&M outbreak to underpin 
the government’s contain, control 
and eradicate policy.” 
Although precise details of the 
initial source of infection remain 
uncertain at the time of going 
to press (as do those of the 
2001 epidemic), the UK’s 2007 
foot-and-mouth outbreak was 
apparently over in less than two 
weeks. The episode had illustrated 
both the best, and the worst, in 
media coverage of science.
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Microbiology.While the Institute of Animal 
Health lab in Pirbright, Surrey, 
may have been an early suspect 
in the outbreak of foot-and-mouth 
disease in the area last month, it 
has been a linchpin of research 
into a number of devastating 
The Pirbright lab of Institute of 
Animal Health may be under the 
spotlight but it has been crucial 
in fighting animal diseases, writes 
Nigel Williams.
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During the seven months of the 
nationwide foot-and-mouth crisis 
in 2001, the lab played a critical 
role. Apart from performing all 
the diagnostic work, it also made 
predictions about the spread of 
the disease, gave scientific advice 
to government and coordinated 
500,000 doses of vaccine in the 
eventuality that this strategy might 
be used in addition to mass culling.
It is an unfortunate irony that 
such a key lab should have been 
implicated for a disease it is 
explicitly trying to control.Issues: The Institute of Animal Health lab in Pirbright, Surrey, has come under intensive 
scrutiny following links with local outbreaks of foot and mouth disease. (Photo: Adrian 
Dennis/AFP/Getty Images.)
